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ABSTRACT 
 
Geographic indicators—trademarks that use a place 
name to indicate goods or services—are now theoretically 
easier to register, even if the good or service does not 
actually come from that place. This shift is a result of three 
cases, two authored by Chief Judge Randall R. Rader of the 
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals (California Innovations 
and Les Halles), and one where he served on the panel 
(Spirits International). These cases made it more difficult 
for a trademark examiner to reject an application for a 
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive mark 
by adding a materiality requirement. However, raising the 
bar was not the intent of the North America Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) amendments, the subject of 
interpretation in the case trio. This Article tracks the 
significant change in the analysis of geographic indicators, 
ultimately arguing that the Federal Circuit should take 
guidance from its earlier opinions, In re Wada and Save 
Venice, and be willing to infer materiality when a location 
is known for a particular good or service. 
                                                                                                         
* Signe H. Naeve is the Associate Director of the Law, Technology & Arts 
Group at the University of Washington School of Law. She would like to thank 
her husband Adam and son Alexander for their support while writing this article. 
She would also like to thank Chief Judge Rader for suggesting analysis of these 
cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Chief Judge Randall R. Rader and the Federal Circuit 
significantly altered the analysis for one class of geographic 
indicators—trademarks that use a place name to indicate goods or 
services—when it decided a trio of trademark cases: California 
Innovations,1 Les Halles,2 and Spirits International.3
                                                                                                         
1 In re Cal. Innovations, Inc., 329 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003), reh’g and 
reh’g en banc denied Aug. 20, 2003. 
 Judge Rader 
2 In re Les Halles de Paris J.V., 334 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
3 In re Spirits Int’l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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authored the first two opinions and served on the panel that 
decided the third. All three cases involved challenges to proposed 
marks that the trademark office had rejected as primarily 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive. Such marks include the 
name of a geographic location where there is an arguably strong 
goods/place association, but the marks are used in connection with 
goods or services that do not actually come from that place. The 
three cases interpreted amendments to the Lanham Act as required 
by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)4
 
 and 
reasoned that the amendments mandated the addition of a 
materiality requirement. This Article explains the addition of this 
requirement and argues that the court misinterpreted the NAFTA 
amendments and unnecessarily raised the standard for rejecting a 
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive mark.  
I. MISDESCRIPTIVE GEOGRAPHIC INDICATORS, NO MATERIALITY 
REQUIRED 
 
Prior to the NAFTA amendments, there were at least five 
categories of geographic indicators.5
                                                                                                         
4 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 605; 
North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 The categories are confusing 
because “descriptive” and “deceptive” are used in multiple sections 
of the statute. To help put these categories in context and to start to 
explain some of the confusingly similar terminology, this section 
will describe geographic indicators from the most innocuous and 
easiest to register to the most deceptive and difficult to register 
under the following basic progression: arbitrary geographically 
descriptive marks > merely descriptive marks > primarily 
geographically descriptive marks > deceptively misdescriptive 
marks > primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive 
marks > deceptive marks. Logically this progression makes some 
sense, although the statute does not follow this order.  
5 For a more comprehensive summary of protection for geographic 
indicators prior to the NAFTA amendments, see Robert Brauneis & Roger E. 
Schechter, Geographic Trademarks and the Protection of Competitor 
Communication, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 782 (2006). 
3
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A.  Geographic Indicators Pre-NAFTA 
 
1. (Arbitrary) Geographically Descriptive Marks  
 
As a general matter, geographically descriptive marks are 
marks that incorporate a term that indicates any geographic 
location.6 These marks are registerable without any showing of 
secondary meaning if they are arbitrary in the sense that no 
consumer would believe that the goods actually came from that 
place.7 Typical examples are “Alaska” on bananas,8 “Eskimo Pies” 
for ice cream bars9 or “Amazon.com” for online retail services.10 
No one would actually believe that the bananas come from Alaska, 
that Eskimos were making ice cream bars, or that the online e-
commerce giant’s services emanated from a river in South 
America.11 The risk of consumer confusion is extremely low in 
these situations and thus registration is justifiable, even without a 
showing of secondary meaning.12
 
 
2. Merely Descriptive (Section 2(e)(1)) and Primarily 
Geographically Descriptive Marks (Section 2(e)(2)) 
 
In contrast to arbitrary geographic indicators, the next 
                                                                                                         
6 See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 14:2 (4th ed. 2012).  
7 See John R. Renaud, Can’t Get There From Here: How NAFTA and 
GATT Have Reduced Protection for Geographical Trademarks, 26 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 1097, 1099 (citing In re Brauerei Aying Franz Inselkammer KG, 217 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 73, 75 (1983)). 
8 See In re Nantucket, Inc., 677 F.2d 95, 98, n.5 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
9 See MCCARTHY, supra note 6, at § 14:7. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 See Mary LaFrance, Innovations Palpitations: The Confusing Status of 
Geographically Misdescriptive Trademarks, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 125, 126 
(2004) (citing In re Wada, 194 F.3d 1297, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Loew’s 
Theatres, Inc., 769 F.2d 764, 767 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re House of Windsor, Inc., 
221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 53 (T.T.A.B. 1983); In re Nantucket, Inc., 677 F.2d 95, 98 
n.5 (C.C.P.A. 1982); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc. 537 F.2d 
4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976)). 
4
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 7, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol7/iss4/10
2012]           CHIEF JUDGE RADER’S MATERIAL CONTRIBUTION 471 
TO GEOGRAPHIC INDICATOR ANALYSIS 
 
categories of geographic indicators did require a showing of 
secondary meaning. Here the statute begins to jump around. Pre-
NAFTA, Section 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act,13 encompassed two 
kinds of geographic indicators, marks that were merely descriptive 
and marks that were deceptively misdescriptive.14 Pre-NAFTA, 
Section 2(e)(2) also encompassed two kinds of geographic 
indicators, marks that were “primarily geographically descriptive 
or deceptively misdescriptive.”15
Merely descriptive marks are marks that fall into the 
“descriptive” category on the Abercrombie spectrum.
 These two statutory sections 
encompassed four categories of geographic indicators: merely 
descriptive, deceptively misdescriptive, primarily geographically 
descriptive, and primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive. Although merely descriptive marks and 
deceptively misdescriptive marks both fall under Section 2(e)(1), 
merely descriptive marks are more closely aligned with primarily 
geographically descriptive marks under Section 2(e)(2). In 
addition, deceptively misdescriptive marks under Section 2(e)(1) 
are more closely aligned with primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive marks under Section 2(e)(2). Hence the explanation 
of the different categories in this essay jumps back and forth 
between these two sections of the statute. 
16 For 
geographic indicators, a mark that is merely descriptive is often a 
mark that indicates where something is from.17
                                                                                                         
13 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (1988) (amended 1993). Citations to the Lanham 
Act will be referred to by the latest section number throughout this Article. 
 Examples include 
Idaho potatoes or Washington apples. However, trademark law 
recognizes a fair use defense that favors allowing retailers to 
accurately describe where their goods come from. As a result, 
before any exclusive use of a geographic term is allowed, 
disclaimers may be necessary, multiple producers may be allowed 
to use the same descriptive term, and, at a minimum, secondary 
14 Id.  
15 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(2) (1988) (amended 1993). 
16 See generally, Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc. 537 F.2d 
4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976). 
17 See MCCARTHY, supra note 6, at §§ 14:2-14:3. 
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meaning may need to be demonstrated.18
Similarly, secondary meaning is required for primarily 
geographically descriptive marks under Section 2(e)(2). A 
primarily geographically descriptive mark could be something like 
Seattle’s Best Coffee for coffee that comes from Seattle or 
California Pizza Kitchen for restaurant services where customers 
would believe that the recipes, and possibly the food, originated in 
California.
 This is the case with 
merely descriptive marks. 
19 Board decisions and case law suggest that merely 
descriptive marks differ from primarily geographically descriptive 
marks in that a merely descriptive mark can describe where 
something is from whereas a primarily geographically descriptive 
mark seems to indicate something more, although many 
commentators lump the two categories together.20 The word 
“primarily” was added to eliminate a previous trademark office 
practice of refusing the registration of a mark if it could be found 
anywhere in an atlas.21 The previous practice had developed 
essentially a per se rule that had led to such “absurd” results as 
denial of Antarctica for soda pop22 or Avon for perfume.23
Similar to the arbitrary geographically descriptive marks, 
where no reasonable consumer would believe that the goods are 
associated with the place name, there is low likelihood of 
consumer confusion for merely descriptive and primarily 
geographically descriptive marks because the goods actually come 
from the place named. Because the mark is not arbitrary, however, 
merely descriptive and primarily geographically descriptive marks 
are treated like non-geographic merely descriptive marks and an 
additional step—a showing of secondary meaning—is required. 
Thus, the key for both merely descriptive and primarily 
geographically descriptive marks is that the goods actually come 
  
                                                                                                         
18 See id. at §§ 14:12-14:14. 
19 See id. at § 14:29 (citing In re Cal. Pizza Kitchen Inc., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1704 (T.T.A.B. 1988)). 
20 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(2) (1988) (amended 1993). 
21 See id. at § 14:27. 
22 Id. (citing Companhia Antarctica Paulista v. Coe, 146 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 
1945), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 880 (1945)). 
23 See id. at § 14:27 (citing In re Cal. Perfume Co., 56 F.2d 885 (C.C.P.A. 
1932)). 
6
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 7, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol7/iss4/10
2012]           CHIEF JUDGE RADER’S MATERIAL CONTRIBUTION 473 
TO GEOGRAPHIC INDICATOR ANALYSIS 
 
from the place named and secondary meaning must be proven.  
 
3. Deceptively Misdescriptive Marks, Section 2(e)(1) 
 
Deceptively misdescriptive marks, meanwhile, are geographic 
in nature, but not arbitrary, and the goods do not actually come 
from the placed named.24 There is an implicit assumption, 
however, that the consumer will not ultimately be influenced to 
purchase the good because the place is not “known for” or 
otherwise lacks a reputation for producing that particular good.25
An example of a deceptively misdescriptive mark presented by 
Professor Mary LaFrance in her article on California Innovations 
is root beer made in Milwaukee, but called “Chicago.”
 
In other words, there is no goods/place association. In this sense, 
the mark differs from other “deceptive” marks such as the 
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks under 
Section 2(e)(2) and deceptive marks under Section 2(a), which will 
be discussed in the next two sections. 
26 Assuming 
that people would not prefer root beer from Milwaukee versus 
Chicago or that that there is no goods/place association between 
Chicago and root beer, then “Chicago” would be allowed to 
register upon a showing of secondary meaning.27 Another example 
could be Arizona for jeans. These marks are deceptive because the 
good is not actually from the place that is being used as a 
geographical indicator. However, the consumer cost is considered 
low because the consuming public will not actually care whether 
the good comes from the place named.28
                                                                                                         
24 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (1988) (amended 1993); U.S. PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, Geographically Deceptive Marks, Basis for Refusal in 
TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1210.05(a) (8th ed. 2011) 
(noting pre-NAFTA basis for refusal). 
 Indeed, consumers may 
come to prefer “Chicago” root beer and “Arizona” jeans without 
ascribing value to whether they actually come from those 
25 See In re House of Windsor, Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 53, 56 (T.T.A.B. 
1983). 
26 See LaFrance, supra note 12, at 137. 
27 Id. at 138. 
28 Id. at 129. 
7
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4. Primarily Geographically Deceptively Misdescriptive Marks, 
Section 2(e)(2) 
 
In contrast to deceptively misdescriptive marks, when it comes 
to primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks, 
people do care where the goods come from. Section 2(e)(2) bars 
registration of a mark that “when used on or in connection with the 
goods of the applicant is primarily geographically descriptive or 
deceptively misdescriptive.”29 In this section, “deceptively 
misdescriptive” is not read on its own, like Section 2(e)(1), but 
rather it is read as “primarily geographically . . . deceptively 
misdescriptive” or simply “primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive.” A primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive mark is one where the term is primarily geographic 
in nature, and there is a goods/place association between the good 
and the geographic location, but the good does not actually come 
from that place.30
Prior to the NAFTA amendments, this category of geographic 
indicator could register upon a showing of secondary meaning, 
provided the mark was not deceptive under Section 2(a).
 An example would be “Seattle’s Best Coffee” 
for coffee that does not actually come from Seattle.  
31 This is 
because Section 2(f) allowed registration for all marks under 
Section 2(e). Section 2(f) stated, “[e]xcept as expressly excluded in 
subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) of this section, nothing herein shall 
prevent the registration of a mark used by the applicant which has 
become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce”32
 
 (i.e. 
the applicant can show secondary meaning). This would include 
marks that were geographically descriptive (“Seattle’s Best 
Coffee” from Seattle), deceptively misdescriptive (“Chicago” root 
beer from Milwaukee), or primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive (“Seattle’s Best Coffee” not from Seattle).  
                                                                                                         
29 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(2) (1988) (amended 1993). 
30 See In re Nantucket, Inc., 677 F.2d 95, 99 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
31 See MCCARTHY, supra note 6, at § 14:31. 
32 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1988) (amended 1993). 
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5. Deceptive Marks, Section 2(a) 
 
In contrast to Section 2(e), which specifically addressed 
geographic marks and allowed registration upon a sharing of 
secondary meaning, section 2(a) covered a broad range of 
deceptive marks.33 Section 2(a) did not explicitly mention 
geographic indicators.34 Nonetheless, if a mark were primarily 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive under 2(e)(2), but it 
were also deceptive under 2(a), then it would be forbidden to 
register, even with a showing of secondary meaning.35
The distinction between a mark which is primarily 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive under 
Section 2(e)(2) of the Trademark Act and a 
geographical mark which is deceptive within the 
meaning of Section 2(a) of the Trademark Act is not 
immediately apparent from a reading of the Act. 
The Act’s legislative history is, likewise, far from 
clear about the intended distinction between a mark 
that is to be denied registration as primarily 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive and one 
that is to be denied registration as deceptive. In fact, 
the legislative history suggests that at least some of 
the drafters perceived no distinction at all. The 
ambiguities in legislative intent notwithstanding, 
basic rules of statutory construction compel us to 
find that there is no distinction between a primarily 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive mark 
(which can be registered with proof of 
distinctiveness under Section 2(f)) and a deceptive 
geographical mark (which is unregisterable even 
 A deceptive 
mark could be perceived as more damaging than the previous 
categories, although the Board and courts have struggled with the 
distinction between the primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive and deceptive marks:  
                                                                                                         
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
9
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under the provisions of Section 2(f)).36
For a mark to be deceptive under 2(a), the Board has noted, it 
would need to be material to the consumer’s decision to purchase 
the good.
 
37
If the location were “noted for” the particular good or service, 
then the mark might be deceptive under Section 2(a).
 
38 This could 
occur when the good is a “principal product” of the location.39 
Accordingly, the pre-NAFTA test was a slightly heightened 
version of the two-part test under section 2(e)(2) inquiring whether 
the mark indicates a geographic term with a goods/place 
association, but the goods do not come from that place, for 
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks:40
In embracing a “materiality” test to distinguish 
marks that fall within the proscription of Section 
2(e)(2) [primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive marks] from those that fall also 
within the proscription of Section 2(a) [deceptive 
marks], we are really saying no more than that we 
must look to the evidence that has been presented 
about the probable reaction of purchasers to a 
particular geographical term when it is applied to 
particular goods. If the evidence shows that the 
geographical area named in the mark is an area 
sufficiently renowned to lead purchasers to make a 
goods-place association but the record does not 
show that goods like applicant’s or goods related to 
applicant’s are a principal product of that 
geographical area, then the deception will most 
likely be found not to be material and the mark, 
therefore, not deceptive. On the other hand, if there 
is evidence that goods like applicant’s or goods 
 
                                                                                                         
36 In re House of Windsor, Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 53, 56 (T.T.A.B. 
1983) (footnote omitted). 
37 Id.   
38 See In re Nantucket, Inc., 677 F.2d 95 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
39 See House of Windsor, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 57. 
40 See LaFrance, supra note 12, at 130. 
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related to applicant’s are a principal product of the 
geographical area named by the mark, then the 
deception will most likely be found material and the 
mark, therefore, deceptive.41
In this slightly heightened analysis, the focus is still on the goods-
place association. In contrast, the focus completely shifted with the 
third of the Rader cases, Spirits International, to whether a 
significant portion of the relevant consuming public would be 
deceived.
 
42
 
  
B.  Geographic Indicators Post-NAFTA 
 
The NAFTA amendments resulted in one major change: the 
Lanham Act was amended to separate primarily geographically 
deceptively misdescriptive marks from other types of geographic 
indicators. The other categories were left largely untouched. This 
section will track the same basic order as the pre-NAFTA sections, 
including the new statutory section numbers.  
 
1. (Arbitrary) Geographically Descriptive Marks 
 
Geographically descriptive marks that are also arbitrary are 
treated the same post-NAFTA as pre-NAFTA: they can register 
without a showing of secondary meaning.43
 
 
2. Merely Descriptive (Section 2(e)(1)) and Primarily 
Geographically Descriptive Marks (Section 2(e)(2)) 
 
Post-NAFTA, Section 2(e)(1) still addresses marks that are 
“merely descriptive” or “deceptively misdescriptive.”44
                                                                                                         
41 House of Windsor, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 56. 
 Marks that 
are merely descriptive can still register upon a showing of 
42 In re Spirits Int’l, 563 F.3d 1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
43 U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, Geographically Descriptive 
Marks—Test in TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1210.01(a) 
(8th ed. 2011) (noting pre-NAFTA basis for refusal). 
44 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (1994). 
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secondary meaning.45 Under Section 2(e)(2), marks that are 
primarily geographically descriptive can register upon a showing 
of secondary meaning or if they are a permissible certification or 
collective mark.46
 
 
3. Deceptively Misdescriptive Marks, Section 2(e)(1) 
 
Similarly, marks that are deceptively misdescriptive can still 
register upon a showing of secondary meaning.47
 
 
4. Primarily Geographically Deceptively Misdescriptive Marks, 
Section 2(e)(3) 
 
While most of the other categories remained the same, the 
primary change effectuated by the NAFTA amendments was 
separating primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive 
marks from primarily geographically descriptive marks under 
Section 2(e)(2). Post-NAFTA, primarily geographically 
deceptively misdescriptive marks have a separate section, Section 
2(e)(3).48 This change is significant because the revised Section 
2(f) allows registration on the principal register upon a showing of 
secondary meaning, except for subsections (a), (b), (c), (d), (e)(3) 
and (e)(5).49 Section 2(a) still addresses deceptive marks.50 Section 
(e)(3) is the new section for primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive marks.51
The only primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive 
marks that could register after the NAFTA amendments were such 
 This leaves sections 2(e)(1) and 2(e)(2) 
otherwise untouched, meaning that merely descriptive, deceptively 
misdescriptive, and primarily geographically descriptive marks can 
still register upon a showing of secondary meaning, but primarily 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks cannot. 
                                                                                                         
45 Id. at (f). 
46 Id. at (e)(2) . 
47 Id. at (f). 
48 Id. at (e)(3). 
49 Id. at (f). 
50 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1994). 
51 Id. at (e)(3). 
12
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 7, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol7/iss4/10
2012]           CHIEF JUDGE RADER’S MATERIAL CONTRIBUTION 479 
TO GEOGRAPHIC INDICATOR ANALYSIS 
 
marks that were distinctive prior to enactment of the amendments. 
Section 2(f) explicitly states: “Nothing in this section shall prevent 
the registration of a mark which, when used on or in connection 
with the goods of the applicant, is primarily geographically 
deceptively misdescriptive of them, and which became distinctive 
of the applicant's goods in commerce before December 8, 1993.”52
 
 
Thus, this “grandfather clause” treats primarily geographically 
deceptively misdescriptive marks prior to December 8, 1993, the 
same as they would have been treated under the former statute, 
Section (2)(e)(2): they could register with a showing of secondary 
meaning whereas the marks under the revised statute could not. 
5. Deceptive Marks, Section 2(a) 
 
Under either version of the Lanham Act, deceptive marks could 
never register, even if secondary meaning could be shown. The 
new Section 2(a) forbids registration if the mark:  
consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or 
scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage 
or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living 
or dead, institutions, beliefs or national symbols, or 
bring them into contempt, or disrepute; or a 
geographical indication which, when used on or in 
connection with wines or spirits, identifies a place 
other than the origin of the goods and is first used 
on or in connection with wines or spirits by the 
applicant on or after one year after the date on 
which the WTO Agreement . . . enters into force 
with respect to the United States.53
It makes sense that wines and spirits would be added to the 
deceptive section, which incorporates the most serious trademark 
offenses, because wines and spirits are afforded the highest level of 
protection for geographic indicators under the Agreement on 
 
                                                                                                         
52 Id. at (f). 
53 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1994). 
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Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property.54 Although section 
2(a) still covers marks that are “deceptive,” only wines and spirits, 
not general goods and services, were added to this Section.55
To illustrate the differences in the Lanham Act, the following 
chart tracks the statutory sections and registration limitations pre 
and post-NAFTA. 
 
 
Pre-NAFTA Registration 
Limitations 
Post-NAFTA Registration 
Limitations 
2(e)(1)- 
merely 
descriptive or 
deceptively 
misdescriptive 
Can register with 
secondary 
meaning 
2(e)(1)- merely 
descriptive or 
deceptively 
misdescriptive 
Can register with 
secondary 
meaning 
2(e)(2)- 
primarily 
geographically 
descriptive or 
deceptively 
misdescriptive 
Can register with 
secondary 
meaning 
2(e)(2)- 
primarily 
geographically 
descriptive 
Can register with 
secondary 
meaning 
  2(e)(3)- 
primarily 
geographically 
deceptively 
misdescriptive 
Can only register 
if distinctive 
prior to 
December 8, 
1993  
2(a) deceptive Cannot register 2(a) deceptive 
[references 
wine and spirits 
for GIs] 
Cannot register 
 
 
                                                                                                         
54 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE RESULTS OF 
THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 320 (1999), 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs]; Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act, Pub. L. No 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). See also Kevin M. 
Murphy, Conflict, Confusion, and Bias Under TRIPs Articles 22-24, 19 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 1181, 1211 (2004). 
55 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (Supp. V 1994). 
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II. CALIFORNIA INNOVATIONS AND LES HALLES ADD  
A MATERIALITY REQUIREMENT 
 
In 2003, Judge Rader authored both In re California 
Innovations, Inc.56 and In re Les Halles de Paris J.V,.57 
interpreting the NAFTA amendments. California Innovations 
addressed primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive 
marks for goods and Les Halles addressed the same for services. 
Judge Rader’s significant contribution to trademark jurisprudence 
is that these cases added a materiality requirement for such marks, 
previously only seen for deceptive marks under Section 2(a). This 
requirement was not explicit for primarily geographically 
deceptively misdescriptive marks either pre-NAFTA58 or post-
NAFTA, even in other Federal Circuit cases.59 In adding the 
materiality requirement, Judge Rader and the Federal Circuit raised 
the bar for rejecting a primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive mark.60
 
 
A.  California Innovations 
 
In California Innovations, the applicant had filed a composite 
mark including the words “California Innovations” for car visor 
and trunk organizers; backpacks; thermal tote bags; thermal wraps 
for cans; and nylon, vinyl, polyester and/or leather storage bags.61 
The trademark examiner refused to register the mark, determining 
that it was primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive, 
and the Board upheld this rejection.62
On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the 
  
                                                                                                         
56 329 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
57 334 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
58 See, e.g., In re Nantucket, Inc., 677 F.2d 95 (C.C.P.A. 1982); Institut 
Nat’l des Appellations D’Origine v. Vintners Int’l Co., Inc., 958 F.2d 1574 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992). 
59 See, e.g., In re Hiromichi Wada, 194 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re 
Save Venice New York, Inc., 259 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
60 See MCCARTHY, supra note 6, at § 14:33. 
61 329 F.3d at 1336. 
62 Id.  
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Board’s decision, reasoning that the Board had failed to apply an 
updated test now required by the NAFTA amendments.63 Instead 
of the two-part test applied pre-NAFTA in cases such as In re 
Nantucket,64 and Vintners65 and post-NAFTA in cases such as 
Wada66 and Save Venice,67 the court determined that there was 
now a third step to the analysis: an assessment of materiality.68
(1) the primary significance of the mark is a 
generally known geographic location, (2) the 
consuming public is likely to believe the place 
identified by the mark indicates the origin of the 
goods bearing the mark, when in fact the goods do 
not come from that place, and (3) the 
misrepresentation was a material factor in the 
consumer’s decision.”
 
According to the new test, the trademark office could deny 
registration under Section 2(e)(3) only if: 
69
The court had good reason to believe that the NAFTA 
amendments either raised or lowered the standard for rejecting a 
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive mark; 
however, the court simply went the wrong way.
  
70 Because Section 
2(e)(3) separated primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive marks from merely descriptive, deceptively 
misdescriptive, or primarily geographically descriptive marks, the 
Federal Circuit reasoned that primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive marks should somehow be treated differently than 
before the NAFTA amendments.71
                                                                                                         
63 Id. at 1337. 
 It reasoned that the intent of the 
change was to make primarily geographically deceptively 
64 677 F.2d 95 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
65 Institut Nat’l des Appellations D’Origine v. Vintners Int’l Co., Inc., 958 
F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
66 In re Hiromichi Wada, 194 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
67 In re Save Venice New York, Inc., 259 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
68 See In re Cal. Innovations, Inc., 329 F.3d 1334, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2003), 
reh’g and reh’g en banc denied Aug. 20, 2003. 
69 Id. at 1341 (emphasis added). 
70 See infra, section IV. 
71 Cal. Innovations, 329 F.3d at 1338-40. 
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misdescriptive marks treated the same as other deceptive marks 
under Section 2(a).72
The court reached this conclusion because the other categories 
of marks—merely descriptive, primarily geographically 
descriptive, and deceptively misdescriptive—could still register 
with a showing of secondary meaning, but primarily 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks could not.
  
73 The 
result, an absolute bar, was now harsher than pre-NAFTA, when 
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks could 
register with a showing of secondary meaning.74 As a result, the 
court reasoned, primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive marks were now more like other deceptive marks 
under 2(a), which also could not register, even with a showing of 
secondary meaning.75 Accordingly, the court added a materiality 
requirement that it reasoned was similarly required for a rejection 
under Section 2(a) for deceptive marks.76
 
  
B.  Les Halles 
 
In In re Les Halles de Paris J.V., a panel decision again 
authored by Judge Rader, the Federal Circuit added a materiality 
requirement for primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive services.77 In Les Halles, the trademark office 
denied, and the Board affirmed, an application for “Le Marais” for 
a New York French kosher restaurant, reasoning that the name was 
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive because of a 
false association with a Jewish quarter named Le Marais in 
France.78
                                                                                                         
72 See id. 
 This decision issued just a couple of months after 
California Innovations, so not surprisingly, the court reached a 
similar conclusion. The court vacated and remanded the Board’s 
decision in order to apply the new three-part test, including the 
73 See id. 
74 See id. 
75 See id. at 1337. 
76 See id. at 1338. 
77 See In re Les Halles de Paris J.V., 334 F.3d 1371, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
78 See id. at 1372. 
17
Naeve: Chief Judge Rader's Material Contribution to Geographic Indicator
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2012
484 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS  [VOL. 7:4 
materiality component, articulated in California Innovations.79 
Applying a similar statutory interpretation as in California 
Innovations, the court reasoned that Section 2(e)(3) now requires 
“a focus on whether the public is deceived [similar to Section 
2(a)], rather than solely on whether the mark was distinctive 
[similar to the pre-NAFTA Section 2(e)(2)].”80
 
 
III. SPIRITS INTERNATIONAL RAISES THE MATERIALITY  
REQUIREMENT TO “SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF RELEVANT CLASS” 
 
After California Innovations and Les Halles, Judge Rader sat 
on a panel that again raised the bar for rejecting a mark as 
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive.81 According 
to the court’s decision in Spirits International, authored by Judge 
Dyk, materiality requires that a substantial number of the relevant 
class of consumers is likely to be deceived.82 Specifically, the 
court stated that “in order to establish a prima facie case of 
materiality there must be some indication that a substantial portion 
of the relevant consumers would be materially influenced in the 
decision to purchase the product or service by the geographic 
meaning of the mark.”83 Accordingly, Judge Rader in Spirits 
International, again contributed to a significant change in 
trademark jurisprudence.84
In 1993, Spirits International filed an application for 
“Moskovskaya” on vodka that would not be manufactured, 
produced, or sold in Moscow.
 
85
                                                                                                         
79 See id. at 1373. 
 Shortly thereafter, the trademark 
80 Id. 
81 See MCCARTHY, supra note 6, at § 14:33. 
82 See In re Spirits Int’l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
83 Id. at 1356-57. 
84 See Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal 
Trademark and False Advertising Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305, 1352-73 
(2011) (discussing materiality); Rebeccah Gan, 2009 Trademark Law Decisions 
of the Federal Circuit, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1115, 1122-25. See generally, Travis 
Manfredi, In re Spirits International, N.V. 563 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009), 14 
INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 71 (2009). 
85 See Spirits Int’l, 563 F.3d at 1349-50. 
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examiner refused registration.86 In 1994 the application was 
suspended pending the outcome of three similar applications.87 By 
2006, the other applications had been abandoned and the trademark 
office issued a final refusal for Moscovskaya as primarily 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive.88
The trademark examiner determined that Moscovskaya meant 
“of or from Moscow.”
  
89 The examiner also found that Moscow 
was a generally known geographic location, there was a 
goods/place association between vodka and Moscow, and the 
public would likely believe that the vodka was from Moscow 
because of this association.90 Applying the materiality requirement 
from California Innovations, the examiner determined that the 
mistaken belief would be material to consumers “because Russian 
vodka is highly regarded.”91
The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board agreed with the 
examiner’s decision.
  
92 Regarding materiality, however, the Board 
said that “an appreciable number of consumers” must be 
deceived.93 According to the Board, “[a]ll that is required is a 
showing that some portion of relevant consumers will be 
deceived.”94 The Board found that the materiality requirement was 
met because Russian speakers would be deceived and 706,000 
people in the United States speak Russian.95 This group reflected 
ordinary American purchasers knowledgeable in English and 
Russian, according to the Board.96
On appeal, the Federal Circuit disagreed with this 
interpretation of the materiality requirement. The court implied 
that the number of Russian speakers was relevant to whether the 
 
                                                                                                         
86 See id. at 1350. 
87 See id. 
88 See id. 
89 Id. 
90 See id. 
91 Spirits Int’l, 563 F.3d at 1350. 
92 See id. at 1349. 
93 Id. at 1350. 
94 Id. at 1351. 
95 See id. 
96 See id. 
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mark would be translated under the doctrine of foreign equivalents, 
but not dispositive with regard to materiality.97 Instead, the court 
reasoned that materiality requires an inquiry into whether “a 
substantial portion of the relevant consumers is likely to be 
deceived, not whether any absolute number or particular segment 
of the relevant consumers (such as foreign language speakers) is 
likely to be deceived.”98 Furthermore, those consumers must be 
influenced in their purchasing decision because of this deception.99 
According to the court, the correct inquiry was not whether 
Russian language speakers constituted an appreciable number of 
consumers, “but whether Russian language speakers were a 
substantial portion of the intended audience.”100 The court thus 
remanded the case to determine the composition of the vodka-
buying public, of which, it noted, Russian speakers could be a 
significant portion.101
 
  
IV. THE INTENT OF NAFTA AMENDMENTS WAS NOT TO RAISE 
THE BAR FOR REGISTRATION 
 
Although in many ways the Spirits International interpretation 
flowed from the logic in California Innovations and Les Halles,102 
the problem with the added gloss is that it implies a 
presumptiveness of registerability of geographically deceptive 
marks.103
                                                                                                         
97 See Spirits Int’l, 563 F.3d at 1351. The Federal Circuit’s application of 
the doctrine of foreign equivalents has also been criticized. See Serge Krimnus, 
The Doctrine of Foreign Equivalents at Death’s Door, 12 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 
159, 178-87 (2010); Jonathan Skinner, Overcoming Babel’s Curse: Adapting the 
Doctrine of Foreign Equivalents, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 57, 
§§ V-VI (2011). 
 As the court stated in Spirits International, “in order to 
establish a prima facie case of materiality there must be some 
indication that a substantial portion of the relevant consumers 
would be materially influenced in the decision to purchase the 
98 Spirits Int’l, 563 F.3d at 1353. 
99 See Gan, supra note 84, at 1124. 
100 See Manfredi, supra note 84, at 73.  
101 See Spirits Int’l, 563 F.3d at 1357. 
102 See id. at 1353. 
103 See Tushnet, supra note 84, at 1360.  
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product or service by the geographic meaning of the mark.”104 
Instead of a presumption that misleading geographic indicators 
would not be registerable, as required by NAFTA105 and TRIPs,106 
this statement presumes that misleading geographic indicators will 
be registerable unless “a substantial portion of the relevant 
consumers would be materially influenced.”107 This change in 
presumption again raises the bar and makes it more difficult to 
deny registration for primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive marks, rather than making it easier to deny 
registration of misleading geographic indicators.108
Once Judge Rader and the respective Federal Circuit panels 
interpreted the NAFTA amendments as aligning primarily 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks with other 
deceptive marks under Section 2(a),
 
109 it made some sense for the 
court to add a materiality component because materiality was 
arguably a part of the pre-NAFTA deceptiveness analysis.110 Once 
they decided that it was necessary for goods, it logically followed 
to apply the same or a similar requirement for services. Once the 
court took these steps, it also made some sense to interpret 
materiality to require something similar to unfair competition, 
because Section 2(a) arguably has similar underpinnings.111
                                                                                                         
104 Spirits Int’l, 563 F.3d at 1357 (emphasis added). 
 These 
steps all began with the premise that NAFTA required that the new 
Section 2(e)(3) should be treated the same as Section 2(a) and that 
Section 2(a) required a heightened level of materiality. Because 
these underlying premises are debatable, however, this author  
 
105 See NAFTA, supra note 4, Article 1712(1)(a). 
106 See TRIPs, supra note 53, Articles 22-24. See Murphy, supra note 53, 
at 1221-29; Albrecht Conrad, The Protection of Geographical Indications in the 
TRIPs Agreement, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 11, 24-25 (1996). 
107 Spirits Int’l, 563 F.3d at 1357. 
108 See Tushnet, supra note 84, at 1360; LaFrance, supra note 12 at 141-
47.  
109 Spirits Int’l, 563 F.3d at 1353 (citing Cal. Innovations, 329 F.3d at 
1339-40). 
110 See Institut Nat. Des Appellations D'Origine v. Vintners Intern. Co., 
Inc., 958 F.2d 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
111 See Spirits Int’l, 563 F.3d at 1355-56. 
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suggests that the Federal Circuit took a wrong turn at the 
beginning. 
 
A.  NAFTA Amendments Separated Primarily Geographically 
Deceptively Misdescriptive Marks from Primarily 
Geographically Descriptive Marks 
 
The primary purpose of the NAFTA amendments was to forbid 
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks from 
registering, even if secondary meaning could be shown. The main 
intent of the changes was to decouple section 2(e)(2), and thus to 
further separate primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive marks under (2(e)(2)) from ones that were primarily 
geographically descriptive under (2(e)(2)) or even ones that were 
geographically misdescriptive under (2(e)(1)), not to treat them the 
same as deceptive marks under Section 2(a). The result would be 
to lower the bar for rejecting a primarily geographically 
deceptively misdescriptive mark, rather than raising it. 
By placing primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive 
marks in their own section and carving them out from other 
geographic indicators capable of registration, while not including 
them in the section for deceptive marks, Congress indicated its 
intent to treat such marks independently. This suggests that 
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks should 
now be treated more critically than before.112
Paragraphs two and three of Article 1712 require 
 Separating primarily 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks from primarily 
geographically descriptive marks does not automatically lead to an 
inference that they should be treated on the same level as deceptive 
marks. Rather, the only clear inference is that Congress intended 
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks to be 
treated differently than primarily geographically descriptive marks, 
because these were the only classifications now placed in separate 
subsections. The Senate Report supports this interpretation:  
                                                                                                         
112 See Eleanor K. Meltzer, Where in the World is ? Examination of 
Trademarks Containing Geographical Indicators Under NAFTA, 77 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 803, 805-06 (1995). 
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NAFTA governments to refuse to register marks 
that are deceptively misdescriptive in respect of 
geographic origin regardless of whether the mark 
has acquired distinctiveness. By contrast, the article 
does not prohibit the registration of primarily 
geographically descriptive marks. 
In light of this difference in treatment, section 333 
of the bill creates a distinction in subsection 2(e) of 
the Trademark Act between geographically 
“descriptive” and “misdescriptive” marks and 
amends subsections 2(f) and 23(a) of the Act to 
preclude registration of “primarily geographically 
deceptively misdescriptive” marks on the principal 
and supplemental registers, respectively. The law as 
it relates to “primarily geographically descriptive 
marks” would remain unchanged.113
The intention of this separation is also clear from the 
grandfather clause and the additional changes to subsection 2(f), 
the section that relates to secondary meaning. The grandfather 
clause added to Section 2(f) permits registration of primarily 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks if they acquired 
distinctiveness prior to December 8, 1993, the date of the NAFTA 
amendments.
 
114 This grandfather clause intentionally carves out 
the limited circumstance under which primarily geographically 
deceptively misdescriptive marks could register—if they are pre-
NAFTA marks and they have acquired secondary meaning. A 
straight-forward reading of the statute, consistent with legislative 
intent, would make this the only registerable category of primarily 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks.115
Conversely, under the revised Section 2(f), primarily 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks can no longer 
register with a showing of secondary meaning, whereas primarily 
geographically descriptive (and even deceptively misdescriptive) 
  
                                                                                                         
113 S. REP. No. 103-189, at 124 (1993). 
114 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1994). 
115 See LaFrance, supra note 12, 145-46. 
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marks still can.116
If Congress had wanted primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive marks to be treated the same as deceptive marks, it 
could have simply eliminated any reference to primarily 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks from the statute. 
If they were indeed now covered under Section 2(a), listing them 
in their own subsection would be superfluous.
 Accordingly, all that one may infer from the 
NAFTA amendments is that primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive marks should now be treated differently from 
primarily geographically descriptive marks, not that they should be 
treated the same as other deceptive marks. Furthermore, primarily 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks cannot register 
even with a showing of secondary meaning. In this sense, there is a 
clear intent that fewer primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive marks should register. 
117
Instead of adding primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive marks to Section 2(a) or eliminating it altogether, 
Congress later added the narrower category of geographically 
deceptive wine and spirits to Section 2(a).
 Congress could 
have easily added primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive marks to Section 2(a) instead of giving them their 
own subsection. The amendments were an opportunity to make 
either of these changes and to streamline deceptiveness analysis, 
yet Congress opted not to make these changes. Instead of adding 
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks to 
Section 2(a) either explicitly or by eliminating them altogether, 
they were placed in their own section, Section 2(e)(3).  
118 Congress could have 
added all (deceptive) geographic indicator goods and services, but 
did not. This may be because Article 23 of TRIPs treats wines and 
spirits differently from other geographic indicators.119
                                                                                                         
116 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1994). 
 Wine and 
spirits that are simply deceptively misdescriptive under the pre-
NAFTA standards would not be allowed to register unless they 
were grandfathered in or otherwise exempt. This means that unless 
a wine or spirit were considered generic, appears on the list of 
117 See generally, LaFrance, supra note 12.  
118 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1994). 
119 See TRIPs, supra note 53, art. 23. 
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semi-generic wines, or was specifically grandfathered in, the mark 
could not register if it indicates a place that is not actually the 
source of the wine or spirit.120
This tells us two things. First, that not all subcategories of 
Section 2(a) have a materiality requirement. This is true also of 
other enumerated categories under section 2(a), such as functional 
marks. Even if primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive 
marks were specifically listed under Section 2(a), this would not 
mean that a showing of materiality would be required. Second, 
Congress could have added all (deceptive) geographic indicators to 
Section 2(a), but chose only to specifically include wines and 
spirits.
 Significantly, no materiality is 
required for wines and spirits.  
121
 
 The result of the Rader case trio, however, is that there is 
now a more stringent test in place to reject a proposed primarily 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive mark. 
B.  NAFTA and TRIPs Mandate that Geographic Indicators  
Should Not Be Misleading 
 
When the United States signed NAFTA and TRIPs, it agreed to 
forbid registration of “misleading” geographic indicators as 
trademarks.122 NAFTA Article 1712(1)(a) required its signatories 
to prohibit trademark registration of geographic indicators for 
goods that do not originate in the place named if the public would 
be misled as to the geographic origin of the goods.123 Articles 22-
24 of TRIPs, meanwhile, also prohibit geographic indicators that 
would mislead, although there is less room for misdescriptive 
marks for wines and spirits.124
                                                                                                         
120 See id. 
 The implementation of Article 
1712(1)(a) of the NAFTA agreement has already been discussed in 
some detail. Congress opted not to make additional amendments to 
121 Even if non-wine and spirit GIs should have a materiality standard in 
order to distinguish them from wine and spirits, which are unregisterable merely 
if they are deceptively misdescriptive, Spirits International raised the standard 
beyond the previous deceptiveness standard under Section 2(a). 
122 See Brauneis and Schechter, supra note 5, 835. 
123 See NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1712(1)(a).  
124 See TRIPs, supra note 53, art. 22-24. 
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the Lanham Act for deceptive goods and services following 
TRIPs.125 “Misleading” for both NAFTA and TRIPs refers to the 
geographic source, not to consumers generally being misled.126
As a result of the NAFTA amendments, reinforced by TRIPs, 
trademark examiners should now have a lower bar for refusing 
registration of primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive 
marks. As one trademark examiner opined shortly after the 
changes: 
 
Section 2(e)(3) represents a much more serious 
challenge to registration than did its predecessor 
Section 2(e)(2). Section 2(e)(3) eliminates the two-
part analysis that was required under former Section 
2(e)(2) to determine whether a mark is absolutely 
unregisterable under Section 2(a). Prior to 
December 8, 1993, marks would be considered 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive under 
Section 2(a) only when the place named was well-
known or “noted for” the goods or services named 
and such fact would materially influence the 
consumer. Therefore, under former Section 2(e)(2), 
the examining attorney reviewed marks containing 
geographic indicators to determine whether the 
place identified was likely to be material to 
consumers’ decision to purchase the goods or use 
the services. If so, and if the goods or services did 
not come from the place named, the mark would be 
absolutely unregisterable under Section 2(a). 
However, if the place named was not likely to 
materially influence a consumer, the mark would 
“only” be considered primarily geographically 
deceptively misdescriptive and thus registerable 
under Section 2(f).127
Denial to register such misleading geographic indicators would 
be easier post-NAFTA, and the bar would be lower, precisely 
 
                                                                                                         
125 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1994). 
126 See Brauneis and Schechter, supra note 5, 836. 
127 Meltzer, supra note 112, 806. 
26
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 7, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol7/iss4/10
2012]           CHIEF JUDGE RADER’S MATERIAL CONTRIBUTION 493 
TO GEOGRAPHIC INDICATOR ANALYSIS 
 
because the materiality requirement would not now be reached 
under Section 2(e)(3): 
For applications filed after December 8, 1993, the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office will consider the 
geographic indicator in a proposed mark to be 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive if the 
geographic location is neither obscure nor remote 
and the applicant’s goods and/or services are not 
manufactured, rendered, or produced in the location 
indicated. In this respect, a refusal under Section 
2(e)(3) is much closer to an absolute bar to 
registration under Section 2(a) than was a similar 
refusal under the old Section 2(e)(2), because the 
question of material influence on the consumer may 
never be reached. Furthermore, since the Office 
now reviews geographic terms solely in light of 
their significance as geographic indicators, it is of 
little relevance, for purposes of overcoming a 
refusal under Section 2(e)(3), to indicate that a 
particular geographic location is not “noted for” 
specific goods or services.128
Indeed, other articles have argued that the NAFTA 
amendments made it harder to register deceptive marks at all, even 
those that would have been permissible pre-NAFTA.
 
129
 
 Judge 
Rader and the Federal Circuit in California Innovations, Les 
Halles, and Spirits International took the opposite approach, going 
too far in the direction of protecting primarily geographically 
deceptively misdescriptive marks, even when they are misleading. 
V. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT SHOULD INFER MATERIALITY IF A 
PLACE IS “KNOWN FOR” A GOOD OR SERVICE 
 
After the NAFTA Amendments and prior to the Rader GI trio, 
the Federal Circuit decided two cases involving geographic 
                                                                                                         
128 Id. 
129 See, e.g., Renaud, supra note 7.  
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indicators that were allegedly primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive. These cases are significant because they did not 
interpret the NAFTA amendments as requiring a separate 
materiality analysis, as the court did in California Innovations, Les 
Halles, and Spirits International. The Federal Circuit could now 
look back to these cases for some additional guidance, even if it 
still imposes a materiality standard. 
In both In re Wada130 and Save Venice,131 the court inferred 
some level of deceptiveness (and arguably materiality) either 
because the location was known for the goods in question or 
because there was a strong goods/place association. This could be 
because the location was known for a particular good or because 
the good was a principal product of that location. The “known for” 
and “principal product” language echoes the previous version of 
materiality under pre-NAFTA 2(a), suggesting that an additional 
materiality step would not be required.132 An inference of 
materiality, furthermore, would provide some temperance to the 
additional step taken in Spirits International.133
 
 
A.  In re Wada 
 
In 1999, the Federal Circuit decided In re Wada. The 
trademark applicant, Wada, sought to register “New York Ways 
Gallery” for various “leather bags, luggage, backpacks, wallets, 
[and] tote bags.”134 The trademark examiner rejected the 
application because the primary significance of “New York” was 
geographical, the evidence supported the determination that the 
public associated hand bags and luggage with New York, and the 
goods were not from New York.135
                                                                                                         
130 In re Hiromichi Wada, 194 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 Wada appealed and the 
131 In re Save Venice New York, Inc., 259 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
132 See In re Nantucket, Inc., 677 F.2d 95, 97 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re House 
of Windsor, Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 53, 57 (T.T.A.B. 1983). 
133 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit, post-NAFTA in these cases, applied 
the reasoning from pre-NAFTA cases such as Vintners and Nantucket, which 
support the conclusion that a mistaken goods/place association can deceive the 
public and render a mark primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive. 
134 In re Wada, 194 F.3d 1297, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
135 See id. 
28
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 7, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol7/iss4/10
2012]           CHIEF JUDGE RADER’S MATERIAL CONTRIBUTION 495 
TO GEOGRAPHIC INDICATOR ANALYSIS 
 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board affirmed the refusal concluding 
that the proposed mark was primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive.136 In particular, the Board identified evidence that 
“(1) New York is a well-known geographic place and (2) New 
York is a well-known place where leather goods and handbags are 
designed and manufactured.”137 It rejected Wada’s contention that 
the mark was “intended to evoke a ‘New York Style’” and thus 
was not primarily geographic in nature.138
The court applied a two-part analysis in assessing the Board’s 
refusal. First, is the mark’s primary significance a generally known 
geographic place?
 
139 Second, does the mark identify products that 
purchasers are likely to believe mistakenly are connected with that 
location?140 To satisfy the second inquiry requires a showing that 
“the public is likely to believe mistakenly that the mark identifies a 
place connected with the goods—a goods/place association.”141 
The Board had found it likely that the public would believe that 
bags bearing the mark “New York Ways Gallery” would have 
some connection with New York, which they did not, and hence 
would be deceived.142 The Board relied upon evidence that New 
York is a renowned fashion center, well-known for the 
manufacture of handbags.143 Manufacturer listings and NEXIS 
excerpts showing leather goods and handbag manufacturers 
located in New York supported the Board’s conclusions.144
 
 
B.  In re Save Venice 
 
Two years later, in In re Save Venice New York, Inc., the 
Federal Circuit again affirmed the Trademark Trial and Appeal 
                                                                                                         
136 See id. 
137 Id. 
138 See id. 
139 See id. at 1299-1300 (citing Institut Nat’l Des Appellations D’Oirgine 
v. Vintners Int’l Co., 958 F.2d 1574, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). 
140 See id.  
141 Id. (citing In re Nantucket, Inc., 677 F.2d 95, 99 (C.C.P.A. 1982)). 
142 See id. at 1300. 
143 See id. 
144 See id. 
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Board’s rejection of a primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive mark.145 The applicant had sought to register 
composite marks for “The Venice Collection” and “Save Venice 
Inc.” with a winged Lion of St. Mark, an image affiliated with the 
City of Venice.146 The applicant filed in nine international classes, 
including potpourri, tableware, lamps, clocks, art prints, paper 
products, furniture, dinnerware, glassware, bedding, and carpets.147 
The examiner relied upon an encyclopedia and a gazetteer and 
determined that Venice is “known for paper, publishing, printing, 
textiles, jewelry, art objects, glassmaking, housewares and lace.”148 
Because the goods were actual goods or associated goods of 
traditional Venetian products and the goods did not come from 
Venice, the examiner concluded that the public would mistakenly 
believe that there was a goods/place association and be 
deceived.149 The Board affirmed the examiner’s rejection.150
On appeal, the Federal Circuit applied the same two-part test as 
Wada, inquiring first whether the mark’s primary significance was 
a generally known geographic location and, second, whether 
consumers would reasonably believe that the applicant’s goods 
were connected with the geographic location, when they indeed 
were not.
 
151 Discussing when a mark would pass the goods/place 
association test, the court stated that “if the public would not 
reasonably associate the goods with the geographic location 
indicated by the mark, ‘the public is not deceived and the mark is 
accordingly not primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive.’”152 Such a mark would be able to register.153
                                                                                                         
145 In re Save Venice New York, Inc., 259 F.3d 1346, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 
2001). 
 In 
this case, however, the mark was primarily geographic, there was a 
goods/place association between the goods and Venice, or they  
 
146 See id. at 1349-50. 
147 See id. at 1350. 
148 Id. 
149 See id. 
150 See id. at 1351. 
151 See Save Venice, 259 F.3d at 1351. 
152 Id. at 1354 (quoting Nantucket, 677 F.2d at 99). 
153 See Save Venice, 259 F.3d at 1354. 
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were associated goods, and those goods did not come from 
Venice.154
 
  
C.  Examination Practicalities and Burden of Proof 
 
When considering In re Wada, Save Venice, and the new 
materiality standard, it is important to recognize that challenges to 
geographical indicators are often cases without a third party. Thus, 
it is the trademark examiner who bears the burden of proof that the 
mark is primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive.155 In 
Wada and Save Venice, the examiners were able to rely upon 
gazetteers, encyclopedias, and Internet searches to prove a 
goods/place association, whereas California Innovations, Les 
Halles, and Spirits International suggest that an actual survey 
might be necessary to show materiality, an undertaking not 
reasonably feasible nor warranted for a trademark examiner. 
Demonstrating the ambiguity of the relevant class and the scope of 
deception needed to meet the materiality requirement, the court in 
Spirits International said that “in some cases the entire U.S. 
population would be the intended audience, out of which a 
substantial portion must be deceived.”156
By imposing a willingness to imply materiality, however, 
trademark examiners could continue to rely upon the same forms 
of evidence previously utilized to find a goods/place association 
and to reject primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive 
marks. Perhaps the standard could be raised to “known for” or 
“principal product” rather than a more basic goods/place 
association. This would still be more reasonable than requiring a 
showing of materiality as ultimately articulated in Spirits 
International. This inference would better balance the interests of 
NAFTA and TRIPs to forbid “misleading” geographic indicators. 
There is support for this approach in California Innovations itself 
  
                                                                                                         
154 See id. at 1356. 
155 See MCCARTHY, supra note 6, at § 14:33. Note that all of the primarily 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive cases discussed in this Article were 
cases against the Trademark Office. 
156 Manfredi, supra note 84, at 73; see In re Spirits Int’l, N.V., 563 F.3d 
1347, 1356 (2009). 
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in the way it references In re Wada and Save Venice,157 as well as 
in the trademark office’s interpretations in its manual of examining 
procedures,158 and recent decisions from the Trademark Trial and 
Appeal Board.159
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It is indisputable that Judge Rader and the Federal Circuit’s 
interpretation of the NAFTA amendments have significantly 
altered the analysis and the burden of proof for rejecting primarily 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks by adding a 
materiality requirement. Accordingly, Judge Rader significantly 
contributed to trademark jurisprudence with regard to primarily 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks by changing the 
pre-NAFTA two-part test to the current four-part test: (1) the 
primary significance of the mark is a generally known geographic 
location; (2) the goods or services do not originate in the place 
identified in the mark; (3) purchasers would be likely to believe 
that the goods or services originate in the geographic place 
identified in the mark; and (4) the misrepresentation would be a 
material factor in a significant portion of the relevant consumers’ 
decision to buy the goods or use the services.160
Whereas this test conceivably makes it more difficult to reject a 
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive mark, the 
NAFTA amendments were actually intended to make it easier to 
 
                                                                                                         
157 See In re Cal. Innovations, Inc. 329 F.3d 1334, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
158 See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, Materiality in Cases 
Involving Goods in TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE 
§ 1210.05(c)(i) (8th ed. 2011). 
159 See In re Jonathan Drew, Inc., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d 1640 (T.T.A.B. 2010) 
(citing Gazetteer and website evidence from examining attorney to support 
materiality of Kuba Kuba on cigars and refuting argument that more evidence 
was needed in light of California Innovations and Spirits International); In re 
Compania de Licores Internacionales S.A., No. 75010230, 2012 WL 1267898 
(T.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2012) (reasoning that materiality can be inferred from 
evidence that a place is famous as a source of particular goods, Cuban rum in 
this instance). 
160 See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 158, at 
§ 1210.05(b). 
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reject this category of marks. Statutory construction suggests that 
the NAFTA amendments only meant to carve out an exception that 
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks could 
not register, even with a showing of secondary meaning, whereas 
merely descriptive, primarily geographically descriptive, and even 
deceptively misdescriptive marks still could. As a result, primarily 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks were meant to be 
more difficult to register, not more difficult to reject. Thus, this 
author believes that the NAFTA amendments, however inartfully 
written, were intended to actually lower the bar for rejection, rather 
than raise the bar to the deceptiveness standard. To recognize this 
intent, the Federal Circuit could seek guidance from its previous 
decisions in In re Wada and Save Venice, and imply materiality 
under similar situations to those cases when a location is “known 
for” a particular good or the good is a “principal product” of that 
location. 
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